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Abstract—Due to the increasing availability and functionality of
image editing tools, many forensic techniques such as digital image
authentication, source identification and tamper detection are impor-
tant for forensic image analysis. In this paper, we describe a machine
learning based system to address the forensic analysis of scanner
devices. The proposed system uses deep-learning to automatically learn
the intrinsic features from various scanned images. Our experimental
results show that high accuracy can be achieved for source scanner
identification. The proposed system can also generate a reliability map
that indicates the manipulated regions in an scanned image.
Keywords-scanner classification; machine learning; media forensics;
convolutional neural network;
I. INTRODUCTION
With powerful image editing tools such as Photoshop and GIMP
being easily accessible, image manipulation has become very easy.
Hence, developing forensic tools to determine the origin or verify
the authenticity of a digital image is important. These tools provide
an indication as to whether an image is modified and the region
where the modification has occurred. A number of methods have
been developed for digital image forensics. For example, forensic
tools have been developed to detect copy-move attacks [1], [2]
and splicing attacks [3]. Methods are also able to identify the
manipulated region regardless of the manipulation types [4], [5].
Other tools are able to identify the digital image capture device
used to acquire the image [6], [7], [8], which can be a first step
in many types of image forensics analysis. The capture of “real”
digital images (not computer-generated images) can be roughly
divided into two categories: digital cameras and scanners.
In this paper, we are interested in forensics analysis of images
captured by scanners. Unlike camera images, scanned images
usually contain additional features produced in the pre-scanning
stage, such as noise patterns or artifacts generated by the devices
producing the “hard-copy” image or document. These scanner-
independent features increase the difficulty in scanner model iden-
tification. Many scanners also use 1D “line” sensors, which are dif-
ferent than the 2D “area” sensors used in cameras. Previous work in
scanner classification and scanned image forensics mainly focus on
handcrafted feature extraction [9], [10], [11]. They extract features
unrelated to image content, such as sensor pattern noise [9], dust
and scratches [10]. In [12], Gou et al. extract statistical features
from images and use principle component analysis (PCA) and
support vector machine (SVM) to do scanner model identification.
The goal is to classify an image based on scanner model rather than
the exact instance of the image. In [9], linear discriminant analysis
(LDA) and SVM are used with the features which describe the
noise pattern of a scanned image to identify the scanner model. This
method achieves high classification accuracy and is robust under
various post-processing (e.g. , contrast stretching and sharpening).
In [10], Dirik et al. propose to use the impurities (i.e. , dirt) on
the scanner pane to identify the scanning device.
Convolutional neural networks (CNNs) such as VGG [13],
ResNet [14], GoogleNet [15], and Xception [16] have produced
state-of-art results in object classification on ImageNet [17]. CNNs
have large learning capacities to “describe” imaging sensor charac-
teristics by capturing low/median/high-level features of images [8].
For this reason, they have been used for camera model identifica-
tion [8], [18] and have achieved state-of-art results.
In this paper, we propose a CNN-based system for scanner model
identification. We will investigate the reduction of the network
depth and number of parameters to account for small image patches
(i.e. , 64 × 64 pixels) while keeping the time for training in a
reasonable range. Inspired by [16], we propose a network that
is light-weight and also combines the advantages of ResNet [14]
and GoogleNet [15]. The proposed system can achieve a good
classification accuracy and generate a reliability map (i.e. , a heat
map, to indicate the suspected manipulated region).
II. PROPOSED SYSTEM
The proposed system is shown in Figure 1. An input image I is
first split into smaller sub-images Is of size n×m pixels. This is
done for four reasons: a) to deal with large scanned images at native
resolution, b) to take location independence into account, c) to
enlarge the dataset, and d) to provide low pre-processing time and
memory usage.
Figure 1: Our approach for scanner model classification.
A. Training
As indicated in Figure 1, input image I is split into sub-images
Is (n×m pixels) in zig-zag form. The values of n and m should
be no smaller than 64. From each Is, a patch of size 64 × 64 is
extracted from a random location. We denote this extracted patch
as Ip. These extracted patches Ip along with their corresponding
labels S are inputs into the network. This pre-processing enables
the proposed system to work with small-size images and use a
(a) Our Proposed Network
(b) The Inception Module
Figure 2: (a) is the neural network architecture investigated in this paper. The input image size is 64 × 64 pixels. The “IP layer” is the
inner product layer. The residential block is a 1 × 1 convolution layer followed by batch normalization. The SoftMax layer acts as a
normalized exponential function applied to the layer before the output. The output of SoftMax layer can be interpreted as the probabilities
of the input image patch belonging to the scanner models individually. The final output layer size is 1×Ns, where Ns is the number of
the scanner models used in the training stage. (b) is the inception module used in (a).
smaller network architecture to save training time and memory
usage. Designing a suitable network architecture is an important
part in the scanner model identification system. There are several
factors that need to be considered to build the network: a) the
kernel size, b) the utilization of pooling layers, c) the depth of the
network, and d) the implementation of the network modules. Our
proposed network is shown in Figure 2.
(a) per patch (b) per image
Figure 3: Confusion matrices for the 10-scanner dataset. Each cell
indicates the classification accuracy of predicated labels based on
true labels.
B. Testing
The same pre-processing procedure as described in the training
section will be used in the testing stage. A test image will first be
split into sub-images, and then subsequently extracted into patches
of size 64×64 pixels. The extracted patches will be used as inputs
for the proposed neural network.
As shown in Figure 1, our proposed system will evaluate
two tasks on scanned images: scanner model classification and
reliability map generation. In Task 1 (scanner model classification),
we assign the predicted scanner labels to both patches Ip and
original images I . The predicted scanner label for the sub-image
Is is the same as the predicted label of its corresponding patch Ip.
The classification decision for the original image I is obtained by
majority voting over the decisions corresponding to its individual
sub-images Is. In Task 2, a reliability map [19] is generated based
on the majority vote result from Task 1. The pixel values in the
reliability map indicate the probability of the corresponding pixel
in the original image being correctly classified. The probability
of pixel x belonging to scanner s is the average value of the
corresponding probabilities for the sub-images that contain pixel
x:
Ps(x) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Ps(Subi) (1)
where Subi indicates the sub-image including pixel x, n indicates
the total number of these sub-images, and Ps(·) indicates the
probability of · belongs to scanner s.
III. THE EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we describe the dataset we use and the experi-
ments conducted by using the proposed system in Figure 1.
A. Dataset
We use the Dartmouth Scanner Dataset for our experiments.1
This dataset contains a total of 3,874 scanned images in JPEG
format from 169 different scanner models. The size of the original
scanned images varies from 500 × 500 pixels to 5, 000 × 5, 000
pixels with various scan resolutions (dpi - dots per inch). For each
scanner model, we randomly partition its images into three subsets
with the ratio of 6:1:3 for training, validation, and testing, respec-
tively. We first construct a small sub-dataset with 10 randomly
selected scanners, known as the “10-scanner dataset”, to evaluate
the performance of the proposed system. We then use the entire
dataset to check whether the system is able to scale to a larger
dataset.
We also constructed several forged images using a copy-move
attack for evaluating our reliability maps. The copied areas are
from the same image (“self copy”) or from a different image in
the dataset (“multi-source copy’).
1We like to thank Professor Hany Farid for making this dataset available.
Network 10 scanners 169 scanners
Ours
per image 96.83% 92.97%
per patch 93.72% 89.69%
Xception [16]
per image 95.24% 93.24%
per patch 92.11% 88.85%
Inception3 [20]
per image 94.44% 90.37%
per patch 91.69% 88.62%
Resnet34 [14]
per image 96.03% 91.67%
per patch 91.72% 88.73%
Table I: The scanner model classification accuracy: “per patch”
rows indicate the classification accuracy on patches Ip; “per image”
rows indicate the classification accuracy for full size images I .
B. Experimental Results
Task 1 — Scanner model classification. Our neural network
(Figure 2a) is implemented in Pytorch using stochastic gradient
descent (SGD) with learning rate 0.01, momentum 0.5 and weight
decay 0.0001. We compare our method with some other CNN
architectures, such as InceptionV3 [20], Resnet34 [14] and Xcep-
tion [16].
Figure 3 reports our results in terms of the confusion matrices
for the 10-scanner dataset. The overall classification accuracy is
93.72% per patch (i.e. without majority vote) and 96.83% per
image (i.e. with majority vote). The high accuracies on patch-
level and image-level classification tasks indicate our model is very
effective on the 10-scanner dataset. The results for both the 10-
scanner dataset and the entire dataset are reported in Table I. On the
10-scanner dataset, our method achieves the highest classification
accuracy on both patches and the images. On the entire dataset,
our method achieves the highest patch-level accuracy. Our image-
level classification accuracy is very close to the highest, the one
which achieved by Xception. It must be noted that our model has
fewer parameters and is shallower compared to the other CNN
architectures.
Figure 4: An original scanned image used for forged image creation
and its corresponding reliability map with sub-images size set to
be 64× 64 pixels and stride set to be 4 pixels.
Task 2 — Reliability Maps. Since our system is aimed at
extracting intrinsic features of scanner models, it should also be
able to identify manipulated region irrespective of image content.
In this task, we investigate to generate a reliability map (i.e. a heat
map) that can indicate suspicious forged areas in the images. The
reliability map is generated based on the predicted label obtained
by majority vote, as explained in equation 1.
Figure 4 shows an example of the reliability map. In the
reliability map, the color of the pixel represents the probability
that it is generated by the predicted scanner model. Color “dark
red” indicates a probability value equal to 1.0, and color “dark
blue” indicates a probability value equal to 0.0. Then we use the
original image from Figure 4 to generate manipulated images in
Photoshop. The forged images are shown in the first column in
Figure 5. The top one is generated by self-image copy-move with
translation operations. The bottom one is generated by copy-pasting
regions in an other image source from different scanner model. The
reliability maps generated with different stride size for these two
forged images are shown in Figure 5. These results indicate the
effectiveness of using our reliability map to indicate the suspicious
forgery.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper we investigate the use of deep-learning methods to
address scanner model classification and localization. Compared
with classical methods, our proposed system can: a) learn intrinsic
scanner features automatically; b) have no restrictions on data
collection; c) associate small image patches (64 × 64 pixels) to
scanner models with high accuracy; and d) detect image forgery and
localization on small image size. Our experimental results shown
in Table I indicate that the proposed system can automatically learn
the inherit features to differentiate scanner models and is robust to
JPEG compression. The results in Figure 5 show the ability of the
proposed system to identify suspected forged regions in scanned
images. These experimental results indicate that our reliability map
provides a way to detect forgeries in scanned images.
Further work will be devoted to: a) improve the neural network
architecture in the proposed system, and b) evaluate the perfor-
mance of the proposed system on scanned documents.
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